Today at Black Hat USA we’re presenting an innovative power grid cyber security solution that greatly improves monitoring of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
Using the IEC 62351 standard for monitoring industrial networks, we demonstrate how four types of hard-to-detect attacks are readily identified.
Today at Black Hat USA I am part of a team speaking about the landmark TRITON malware attack. We are presenting new research on TRITON, releasing two tools to help defend against it and publishing a white paper summarizing our findings.
The TRITON malware attack went beyond other industrial cyber attacks by directly interacting with a Safety Instrumented System (SIS). Asset owners should act immediately to secure their SIS — and the information in our white paper will help.
In 2017, TRITON malware was used to attack a gas facility, directly interacting with its Safety Instrumented System (SIS). Given the significance of this attack, Nozomi Networks conducted research to better understand how TRITON works.
Today we released a Wireshark dissector for the TriStation protocol on GitHub to help the ICS community understand SIS communications. Our complete TRITON analysis will be presented at Black Hat USA 2018.
FireEye has reported that it has recently worked with an industrial operator whose facility was attacked by a new type of ICS malware, which they are calling TRITON. The attack reprogrammed a facility’s Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers, causing them to enter a failed state, and resulting in an automatic shutdown of the industrial process.
The TRITON attack is bold and notable because it is the first known industrial control system (ICS) attack that has targeted and impacted not just an ICS, but SIS equipment. Fortunately, because of the unique nature of how each plant implements its SIS and overall safety measures, the malware is not readily scalable.